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Context of the Tutorial
Adaptability from an Integrated System Perspective
• Intelligent/Adaptive System: Manages data, information, and 
knowledge (DIaK) to achieve its mission (Manage: storage, 
distribution, sharing, maintenance, processing, reasoning, and 
presentation)
• An attribute or quality of intelligent/Adaptive systems 
should be to posses a health management capability 
that:
– Employs knowledge about the system embodying “systems 
thinking” (captures interactions among elements of the system).
– Is continuously vigilant.
– Is comprehensive in assessing health of each element of a 
system.
– Is systematically evolutionary to achieve higher and higher 
functional capability levels (increasing effectiveness).
• In order to make this capability possible, the health 
management system needs to incorporate “intelligence.”
ISHM Definition
• Its own discipline, or sub-discipline under Aerospace 
Systems Design, Systems Engineering, and Systems 
Integration.
• Management of data, information, and knowledge (DIaK) 
with the purposeful objective of determining the health of 
a system (Management: storage, distribution, sharing, 
maintenance, processing, reasoning, and presentation).
• ISHM is akin to having a broad-base team of experts 
who are all individually and collectively observing and 
analyzing a complex system, and communicating 
effectively with each other in order to arrive at an 
accurate and reliable assessment of the health of each 
element of the system.
Humans
Direct mission and solve 
problems beyond the 
reach of automated 
systems with the help of 
automated, diagnostic 
and prognostic tools.
Traditional Avionics Systems
Traditionally designed subsystems form the basis of this 
architecture.  This type of design has proven to be extremely 
reliable and predictable when used within its limits.  Provided that 
the software complexity remains in a region where determinism is 
reasonably guaranteed, only evolutionary change is necessary.
Advanced ISHMTime Critical ISHM System
Where traditional avionics systems become 
uncontrollably complex is in handling the 
interactions between multiple systems 
and in providing significant FDIR 
capabilities.  Time Critical ISHM
is a deterministic and verifiable 
method of handling first failure 
responses and intersystem 
interactions. 
Advanced ISHM provides toolsets 
designed to speed human-driven 
diagnostics of complex system 
failures and interactions.  Relying 
on model-based and data mining 
techniques, it: 
- isolates likely candidate failure
causes  
- prognosticates possible 
workarounds and repairs
- predicts degradation
caused future failures
Interrelationship Between 
Traditional Avionics Systems, 
Time Critical ISHM and Advanced ISHM
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International Space Station Rocket Engine Test Stand
People-Based ISHM is Being Done Today
System: ON BOARD AUTOMATED 
ANALYS CAPABILITY
Operator: FASTER, MORE 
ACCURATE ANALYSIS
Support: FASTER, MORE 
ACCURATE ANALYSIS
Decreased Need
Support: FASTER, MORE 
ACCURATE ANALYSIS
Decreased Need
• Use available SYSTEM-WIDE data, information, and knowledge (DIaK) to
– Identify system state.
– Detect anomaly indicators.
– Determine and confirm anomalies.
– Diagnose causes and determine effects.
– Predict future anomalies.
– Recommend timely mitigation steps.
– Evolve to incorporate new knowledge.
– Enable integrated system awareness by the user (make available relevant 
information when needed and allow to dig deeper for details).
– Manage health information (e.g. anomalies, redlines).
– Capture and manage usage information (e.g. thermal cycles).
– Capture and manage design life and maintenance schedule.
– Enable automated configuration.
– Implement automated and comprehensive data analysis.
– Provide verification of consistency among system states and procedures.
Determination of Health
ISHM Capability Development
ISHM Knowledge Model
• A plethora of Data, Information, and 
Knowledge (DIaK) must be applied to 
achieve high functional capability level 
(FCL) health management.
• The ISHM Domain Model (ISHM-DM) 
encompasses DIaK and the tools to 
implement ISHM capability. 
Classic architecture describing 
how systems are built
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ISHM Capability Development
ISHM Knowledge Architecture
• DIaK in the ISHM-DM are associated with software 
objects that represent process models that take place in 
objects and/or collections of objects that encompass a 
system of interest.
• Process models are organized as objects in a 
hierarchical network (ISHM DIaK Architecture), to reflect 
levels of complexity as processes take place involving 
single elements, subsystems, or the entire system.
– Local processes using local DIaK are at the bottom of the 
hierarchy.
– Processes using increasing DIaK occupy higher levels in the 
network.
ISHM DIaK Architecture (DIaKA)
Intelligent 
Sensor 
Processes 
Intelligent 
Element 
Processes 
Intelligent 
Control 
Processes 
Intelligent 
Subsystem 
Processess 
Intelligent 
System Processes 
Actuator
Intelligent 
Components  
Detection and Confirmation of Anomalies
Consistency Checking Cycle
 Valve 
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: 
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ISHM Capability Development
Standards for ISHM
• IEEE 1451 Family of Standards for Smart Sensors and 
Actuators. Lead by NIST (Dr. Kang Lee).
• OSA-CBM (Open Systems Architecture for Condition 
Based Maintenance). Developed by industry and 
government, and transferred to the MIMOSA (Machine 
Information Management Open Standards Alliance)  
organization.
• OSA-EIA (Open Systems Architecture for Enterprise 
Application Integration).  MIMOSA organization.
ISHM capability must integrate DIaK across physical, virtual, and discipline 
boundaries. This is not possible in an affordable manner unless standards are used 
to achieve plug&play and interoperability.
ISHM Capability Development
Standards for ISHM
ISHM Capability Development
Standards for ISHM
OSA-CBM (MIMOSA)
ISHM Capability Development
Standards for ISHM
Architecture for pilot ISHM system implemented at NASA Kennedy Space Center, Launch 
Complex 20 (LC-20) showing the use of IEEE 1451.1, OSA-CBM, and OSA-EAI standards
Software to develop ISHM 
Domain Models (ISHM-DM’s)
• Object orientation: object representation of system 
physical elements and associated process models is the 
best way to embed DIaK in a systematic and in an 
organized manner.
• Distribution of ISHM-DM’s within and across 
networks: ISHM-DM’s might be distributed among 
processors connected to a network, simply because it is 
necessary to use parallel processing, and/or ISHM-DM’s 
might be created by different people in various 
geographic locations
A software system for ISHM capability should support all core 
capabilities by integrating systematically DIaK through the ISHM-DM
TAXONOMY/ONTOLOGY OF OBJECT ORIENTED 
IMPLEMENTATION
OBJECT
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Information Fusion:
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•Qualitative
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Software to develop ISHM 
Domain Models (ISHM-DM’s)
• Distribution across processing units: Since multiple 
process models are expected to be running at any given 
time, the software environments should support parallel 
processing.
• Inference engine: Many tasks require an inference 
engine. Reasoning and decision making leading to 
anomaly detection, diagnostics, effects, and prognostics; 
require contextual integrity and cause-effect analysis 
using heterogeneous data and information.
A software system for ISHM capability should support all core 
capabilities by integrating systematically DIaK through the ISHM-DM
Software to develop ISHM 
Domain Models (ISHM-DM’s)
• Integrated management of distributed DIaK: DIaK must be 
managed in a way to allow embodiment of systems thinking across 
elements and subsystems. Often this is enabled by definitions of 
relationships among elements of systems that can be physically 
visible (i.e. attached to, belong to a system); or more abstracted 
relationships, as it relates to involvement  by groups of objects in 
process models.
• Definition of dynamic relationships among objects for use in 
reasoning: Often, the framework for reasoning and application of 
process models changes dynamically with configuration changes, 
stages of operation, etc.
A software system for ISHM capability should support all core 
capabilities by integrating systematically DIaK through the ISHM-DM
Software to develop ISHM 
Domain Models (ISHM-DM’s)
• Iconic representation of systems objects with visible and 
virtual links (relationships) used to provide intuitive 
representation of reasoning and context: The mix of object 
orientation and iconic representation of DIaK provides the ability to 
intuitively visualize interrelationships and dig deep into details of the 
ISHM system. As complexity increases, graphical programming and 
visualization become essential.
A software system for ISHM capability should support all core 
capabilities by integrating systematically DIaK through the ISHM-DM
ISHM Domain Model of a Hydraulic 
System, including a Rule example
Transducer Electronic
Data Sheet 
Viewing Windows
Blueline Active 
Monitors
Redline Active 
Monitors
Blueline Alarm 
Queues
Redline Alarm 
Queues
CSG ISHM Domain Model:
User Interfaces
Blueline Details 
and Configuration 
User Interfaces
Redline Details 
and Configuration 
User Interfaces
CSG ISHM Domain Model:
Blueline/Redline User Interfaces
Auto-generated 
Redline Report
Navigation to Transducer 
Where Redline Event Occurred
CSG ISHM Domain Model:
Redline Event Handling
Failures Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA)
MIL-STD-1629A(2) NOT 3
ID # Item-
Functional
Identificati
on
Function Failure 
Modes 
and 
Causes
Mission Phase-
Operational
Mode
Failure Effects
Local                         Next                            
End
Effects                       Higher                        
Effects
Level
Failure 
Detection 
Method
Process 
Equipment
Fluid feed 
subsystem
Leak Sealed subsystem 
maintaining 
pressure
Pressure leak Decreasing
pressure 
measurement
Identify sealed
subsystem, and 
check pressure
sensors for 
decreasing 
pressure.
Elements of an ISHM System:
ISHM Model - Proximate Cause Analysis
Expanded causal-directed graph generated by the 
detection of a leak in the subsystem where a valve was 
opened manually (injected leak)
Causal directed graph dynamically 
generated from events detected 
during the simulated leak at 
GNCP104  
 
ISHM Capability Development
Intelligent Sensors and Components
“The IEEE (Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers) 1451 smart transducer 
interface standards provide the common interface and enabling technology for the 
connectivity of transducers to microprocessors, control and field networks, and data 
acquisition and instrumentation systems. The standardized TEDS specified by IEEE 
1451.2 allows the self-description of sensors and the interfaces provide a 
standardized mechanism to facilitate the plug and play of sensors to networks. The 
network-independent smart transducer object model defined by IEEE 1451.1 allows 
sensor manufacturers to support multiple networks and protocols. Thus, transducer-
to-network interoperability is on the horizon. The inclusion of P1451.3 and P1451.4 to 
the family of 1451 standards will meet the needs of the analog transducer users for 
high-speed applications. In the long run, transducer vendors and users, system 
integrators and network providers can all benefit from the IEEE 1451 interface 
standards [1].”.
Smart Sensor/Actuator (NIST)
“Intelligent Sensor” is a “Smart Sensor” with the ability to provide the following 
functionality: (1) measurement, (2) measure of the quality of the measurement, and 
(3) measure of the “health” of the sensor. The better the sensor provides 
functionalities 2 and 3, the more intelligent it is.
ISHM Capability Development
Intelligent Sensors and Components
• Noise Level Assessment and History
• Spike Detection and History
• Flat Signal Detection and History
• Response Time Characterization
• Intermittency Characterization and History
• Physical Detachment Characterization and History
• Regime Characterization and History
• Curve Fit on Identified Regimes
Typical Process Models for Sensors
“Intelligent Sensor” is a “Smart Sensor” with the ability to provide the following 
functionality: (1) measurement, (2) measure of the quality of the measurement, and 
(3) measure of the “health” of the sensor. The better the sensor provides 
functionalities 2 and 3, the more intelligent it is.
ISHM Capability Development
Intelligent Sensors and Components
Example Intelligent Sensor Implementations
The Virtual Intelligent Sensor Environment (VISE) converts all classic 
sensors installed in a rocket engine test stand into “intelligent sensors.”
ISHM Capability Development
Intelligent Sensors and Components
Mobitrum
www.mobitrum.com
Smart Sensor Systems
www.smartsensorsystems.com
NIST
www.mel.nist.com
Esensors
www.eesensors.com
Example Intelligent Sensor Implementations
Sensor selection and Placement 
for ISHM
• When developing an ISHM capability from the ground 
up, one must optimize sensor suites to achieve 
maximum functional capability (anomaly detection, 
diagnosis, effects, prognostics).
Sensor selection and Placement 
for ISHM
Systematic Sensor Selection Strategy (S4) is a model-based procedure for systematically 
and quantitatively identifying the sensor compliment that optimally achieves the 
health assessment goals of a system (Reference 14 of the paper).
ISHM in Systems Design, 
Integration, and Engineering (SDI&E)
• SDI&E practices are employed to build complex 
systems.
• SDI&E for aerospace systems has developed into its own discipline, 
although theories and concepts have not been adequately 
formalized in an academic sense.
• The role of ISHM in SDI&E is linked to the concept of ISHM-DM’s, 
whereby every element that is part of a system comes with its own 
ISHM-DM that can be rolled-up into an overall system ISHM-DM in a 
plug&play approach.
• When two elements are assembled, the ISHM-DM of each element 
is incorporated into the ISHM-DM of the assembly. In this manner, 
DIaK compartmentalized in each element becomes immediately 
available and useful to the ISHM-DM of the assembly.
ISHM in Systems Design, 
Integration, and Engineering (SDI&E)
ISHM concept for systems integration of ISHM-DM’s
Intelligent Control for ISHM-Enabled 
Systems
• Control of complex systems that are ISHM-enabled is a 
nascent area, simply because ISHM itself is also 
relatively new.
• The objective is for the control function to make use of 
system health information in order to achieve its 
objectives.
The paradigm implies that control systems become users of health 
information, while at the same time making use of actuators to help 
further improve determination of the system health
Intelligent Control for ISHM-Enabled 
Systems
Example Application (Reference 18 of the paper)
Verification and Validation 
Considerations for ISHM
The need to use knowledge, and hence inference engines; 
and the complexities of parallel processing and 
reconciliation of potentially inconsistent outcomes that 
lead to anomaly determination; requires advances in 
verification and validation of the ISHM capability itself
Backup Slides
• Health Electronic Data Sheets (HEDS)
• Repository of anomalies and algorithms
• Transducer Electronic Data Sheets (TEDS)
• Historical test data and analysis results
• Provides ease of data analysis and data trending
Health Assessment Database System 
HADS
Analog Data – 3 tests, multiple channels
HADS Browser Capabilities
• Allows longitudinal analyses and comparisons with previous test results
• Viewing usage statistics on monitored elements
– cycle times on valves
– mean time to failure
• Viewing anomalous events/data trends
• Viewing TEDS
DigitalAn malous Data – 2 tests, 1 channelTEDS Data
HADS Browser Application
CSG ISHM Domain Model:
Top Layer View
ISHM Domain 
Model
Top Layer
Streaming data plots 
from selected sensors
CSG ISHM Domain Model:
Transducer Data Plots
Transducer Anomaly Report Graphs for one sensor in four consecutive tests.
• Evidence of TC 
degradation 
detected by VISE 
anomaly detection
• Advanced 
notification to 
determine the 
health of the 
whole system 
before beginning 
a test
CSG Anomalies Detected
List of Anomaly Detection 
Capabilities
Anomaly/Behavior Demonstrated Cause Detection Approach
Leaks (pipes, valves, etc.) Various Checking for pressure leaks using the concept 
of Pressure Subsystems.
Valve state undetermined Defective feedback sensor
Controller failure
Determines valve state by checking 
consistency of command, feedback, 
open/close switches, and pressure conditions 
upstream and downstream.
Valve oscillation Fluid contamination in hydraulic 
supply
Compare running standard deviation of 
command versus feedback.
Valve stuck Fluid contamination in hydraulic 
supply
Seat seizure
Feedback remains horizontal while command 
changes.
Excessive noise, spikes, etc. Interference Running standard deviation exceeds set limits. 
Thresholds violations during short time spans 
(compared to sensor time-constant).
Degradation Wear, aging Trend detection using curve fitting and 
determination of time-constants.
Prediction-Measurement 
mismatch
Various Use predictive model (e.g. from Modeling & 
Analysis Group) to predict sensor values and 
compare with measurements.
Short-Time Fourier Transform
Segmentation
Determining Valve-State
Valve 
State Command Feedback
Open
limit
Closed 
Limit
Associated Sensors
Open
Open Open True False Agree with model
Healthy
Closed
Closed Closed False True Agree with Model
Healthy
Checking for Pressure Leaks
Runtime Predictive Modeling
5/13/2011 52
Example Signal
Sensor E1HPLOXP1: Pressure, Strain-Gauge - Process: HP LOX
Start: 2/5/01, 13:08  End: 2/6/01, 8:45
flat-with-noise normal, occurrences: 5
step-up normal, occurrences: 2
Exp. time-constant:0.50s
Spec. time-constant: 0.52s
sensor-disturbance occurrences: 5
Exp. time-constant:0.50s
Spec. time-constant: 0.52s
Limit-violation-count since 1/3/01, 3:45: 7
flat-with-noise normal, occurrences: 6
spike Spike-count since 1/3/01, 3:45: 35
sensor-disturbance Occurrences: 6
Exp. time-constant:0.55s
Spec. time-constant: 0.52s
Limit-violation-count since 1/3/01, 3:45: 8
drift-with-noise normal, occurrences: 3
drift-slope: -0.05 PSI/s
expected-warm-up-drift: -0.005 PSI
warm-up period: 2 hr.
time-since-turn-on: 5 hr. 45 min
expected-wear-drift: -0.005 PSI
op-time-since-last-cal: 54 hr
step-down normal, occurrences: 2
Exp. time-constant:0.51s
Spec. time-constant: 0.52s
Process: HP LOX - Start: 2/5/01, 13:08  End: 2/6/01, 8:45
Sensors: E1HPLOXP1: Pressure, Strain-Gauge.  Loc: Top
E1HPLOXP2: Pressure, Piezoelectric. Location: Bottom
E1HPLOXT2: Temperature, Thermocouple K, Loc: Bott
E1HPLOXV1: Valve position, Loc: Bottom
PROCESS RELATED CONDITION MONITORING
Behavior discrepancies E1HPLOXP1: spike
E1HPLOXP1: disturbance
E1HPLOXP1: disturbance
E1HPLOXT1: high noise
CLOSEE1HPLOXP
1 Condition Monitoring
expected drift with temp: -0.001 PSI/s
E1HPLOXT1: Temperature, Thermocouple K, Loc: Top
Intelligent Sensors
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Example Signal
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E1HPLOXV1: Valve position, Loc: Bottom
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Example Signal
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E1HPLOXP1: disturbance
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Condition MonitoringTEMPERATURE
Intelligent Sensors
5/13/2011 55
Intelligent Sensors
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• Extract continuously intuitive descriptions of all signals before, during, 
and after tests (create a complete and meaningful record).
• Identify, diagnose, and propose remedies to abnormal or potentially 
abnormal conditions occurring in all test-stand components (sensors, 
actuators, processes).
Example Signal
sensor-disturbances
LOX TOP TANK 
PRESSURE
LOX TOP TANK
TEMPERATURE
pre-test
step-up step-down
spike
Steady-state
drift Record: pre-test, step-up, sensor 
disturbance, steady state, spike, 
steady-state, sensor-disturbance, 
drift, step-down
Abnormal Conditions: sensor-
disturbance, spike, sensor-
disturbance
Potential Abnormal Conditions: drift.
INTELLIGENT ISHM
ISHM RELATED NEWS ARTICLES
Leonard Nicholson, the Northrop Grumman-Boeing team's deputy 
program manager.
• "The CEV we plan to build will benefit not so much from a single, 
technical breakthrough but rather from evolutionary improvements in 
structural technologies, electronics, avionics, thermal-management 
systems, software and integrated system health management
systems over the past 40 years." 
• CEV will use two fault-tolerant subsystems and integrated system 
health management systems to allow it to detect, isolate and recover 
from subsystem failures. By comparison, Apollo generally had only 
single fault tolerance. 
ISHM RELATED NEWS ARTICLES
• The last Delta 4 to fly was the heavy-lift version, which blasted off from 
Cape Canaveral Air Force Station in December of last year. However, 
during what looked like a flaw-free ride to space, its first stage failed and its 
payload -- a mock weight simulating a satellite -- ended up 10,000 miles 
short of its target.
• The problem: fuel sloshing inside the booster caused some sensors to 
believe the rocket's tanks had run dry, shutting down the first-stage engines 
earlier than expected.
This is a case when a decision to shut down engines is done with limited 
information that does not take advantage of integrated awareness brought 
about by ISHM capability. Other relevant conditions such as the pressure in 
the tanks, signs of leakage in the tank and valves/pipes attached to it, other 
indicators that the engines and surrounding elements may (or may not) be 
entering a regime associated with fuel starvation, etc. could have been 
considered.
• Smart sensor
– NCAP (Go Active, Announce)
– Publish data
– Set/Get TEDS
• Intelligent sensor
– Set/Get HEDS
– Publish health
• Detect classes of anomalies using:
– Using statistical measures
• Mean
• Standard deviation
• RMS
– Polynomial fits
– Derivatives (1st, 2nd)
– Filtering—e.g., Butterworth HP
– FFT—e.g., 64-point
– Wavelet Transforms (segmentation)
– Algorithms for
– Flat
– Impulsive (“spike”) noise
– White noise
– Other (ANN, etc.)
Intelligent Sensors have 
embedded ISHM 
functionality and support 
Smart Sensor standards
Intelligent Sensors
Humans
Direct mission and solve 
problems beyond the 
reach of automated 
systems with the help of 
automated, diagnostic 
and prognostic tools.
Traditional Avionics Systems
Traditionally designed subsystems form the basis of this 
architecture.  This type of design has proven to be extremely 
reliable and predictable when used within its limits.  Provided that 
the software complexity remains in a region where determinism is 
reasonably guaranteed, only evolutionary change is necessary.
Advanced ISHMTime Critical ISHM System
Where traditional avionics systems become 
uncontrollably complex is in handling the 
interactions between multiple systems 
and in providing significant FDIR 
capabilities.  Time Critical ISHM
is a deterministic and verifiable 
method of handling first failure 
responses and intersystem 
interactions. 
Advanced ISHM provides toolsets 
designed to speed human-driven 
diagnostics of complex system 
failures and interactions.  Relying 
on model-based and data mining 
techniques, it: 
- isolates likely candidate failure
causes  
- prognosticates possible 
workarounds and repairs
- predicts degradation
caused future failures
Interrelationship Between 
Traditional Avionics Systems, 
Time Critical ISHM and Advanced ISHM
Complexity of Function
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Traditional Avionics System
Current FDIR
Operations Personnel and Crew
- Constant activity
- Nominal operations
- Deterministic
- Autonomous, but monitored
- Covers first failure
- Deterministic
- Advises humans on all actions
Current Division of Capabilities
The wedge of work currently 
performed by humans 
necessitaes a very large and 
complex operations 
infrastructure.  Long term 
recurrent ops cost savings can 
only be realized through 
dramatically more capable tools.
Subsystem
first 
failure
response. Imminent failures
and complex 
or new failures.
Nominal 
system 
functions
- Handle all nontrivial anomalies
- Minimal computational assistance
- Expensive
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Traditional Avionics System
Time Critical ISHM
Advanced ISHM Assisted Humans
- Constant activity
- Nominal operations
- Deterministic
- Autonomous, but monitored
- Accounts for low-level FDIR response
- Covers first failure
- Deterministic
- Advises humans on all actions
- Takes no actions except human alerts
- Advises and assists humans
- Speculative
Initial ISHM Capabilties Breakout
Initially, the Time-Critical ISHM system will 
integrate the functions of FDIR and add only a 
smallwedge of capability.  Advanced ISHM will 
speed the human-directed troubleshooting 
efforts.  
As Advanced ISHM technologies mature to a 
certifyable state, more are added to the Time-
Critical portion, further relieving the human 
workload and therefore cost.
Intersystem
coordination &
first failure
response. Imminent failures
and complex 
or new failures.
Nominal 
system 
functions
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Traditional Avionics System
Time Critical ISHM
Advanced ISHM Assisted Humans
- Constant activity
- Nominal operations
- Deterministic
- Autonomous, but monitored
- Covers first failure
- Deterministic
- Advises humans on all actions
- ISHM takes no actions except human alerts
- Advises and assists humans
- Speculative
Evolved ISHM Capabilities
As Advanced ISHM technologies 
mature to a certifyable state, 
more are added to the Time-
Critical portion, further relieving 
the human workload and 
therefore cost.
Nominal 
system 
functions
Intersystem
coordination &
first failure
response.
Imminent failures
and very complex 
or new failures.
Complexity of System
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Traditional
Avionics
System
All slack must be 
carried by Humans
Reliability Requirement
Traditional
+ 
Time Crit ISHM
+
Adv ISHM
Current ISS Ops Cost
Cost Savings from Advanced Systems
Traditional
+ 
Time Critical
ISHM
Safety Impacts
Source:  2002 Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) Report on ISS
"The C&DH system is vulnerable to instability under heavy load conditions.  The ISS has developed operational guidelines 
that control this problem.  This is an acceptable mode of operation during the construction phase of the ISS. But is not 
adequate for conducting scientific research in a production environment in which many activities execute concurrently.  
Recommendation 01-20a indicated that NASA should "Gain an improved understanding of the range of commanding 
problems that lead to constraints on the system." Although the Panel believes that NASA is making progress on this 
recommendation, the Panel plans to reexamine the issue in the coming year.  Recommendation 01-20a is continuing.“
ISHM technologies being matured include real time and design-time tools which 
assist in uncovering the state space of software and hardware-software interactions
"Recommendation 01-20c renews the earlier concern about the adequacy of the current C&DH architecture and component 
performance.  The recommendation is "Evaluate potential architectures that would improve the systems stability and 
robustness and ensure safe operations.  Implement architecture improvements as soon as it is prudent to do so."  
Therefore Recommendation 01-20c is continuing."
One purpose of advanced components of ISHM is to address those faults and errors 
which are too complex to be programmed into a deterministic system.  ISHM increases the 
robustness by accelerating and improving the ability of operators to handle complex faults.
"Finding 01-17  Instances of anomalies in crew performance may be increasing.  Recommendation 02-17: Review all data 
on crew performance and all root causes of crew incidents to determine if a trend is apparent.  Take appropriate action."
ISHM provides the crew with two capabilities: 
(a) increased insight into the system and correlations between events and 
(b) moving training and operations away from fixed procedures and towards problem solving and adaptable mission 
management.
Recommendation 02-18:  Ascertain the availability of functional redundancy through dissimilar computer hardware and 
software for all safety-critical functions.  Predicated on a prioritization of criticality, develop a program to provide requisite 
functional redundancy. 
ISHM components can be implemented  as in-band and out-of-band systems, operating on different 
hardware, software and design processes than the core system. The ISHM embedded system can therefore provide critical 
system diversity without the added cost of providing redundant disparate control systems.
"Finding 02-22:  It is necessary for software assurance, of which IV&V is a part, to evolve in response to advances in 
information technology.  Nondeterministic systems, such as those constructed from neural nets and other artificial-
intelligence approaches, offer particular challenges for validation and verification.  The attempt to take advantage of COTS 
software requires that such software be verified and validated not only in accord with its original intent, but also in case it is 
modified or customized for a specific application and within its new environment.  Recommendation 02-22:  Maintain a 
robust research and development effort within the NASA IV&V program.  Establish reasonable and supportive funding 
levels for this effort.  Create a research agenda in cooperation with NASA's operational and research enterprises.  Provide 
oversight by program and project managers to ensure that the research meets their needs."
ISHM addresses this recommendation in two ways:
1) ISHM brings the world's leaders in artificial intelligence, information technology, and COTS together.  An endogenous 
expertise in these areas will facilitate the development of V&V technology designed for these types of computational 
systems.
2)  ISHM is, at its core, a runtime V&V system.  The state space of any large software product is vast enough to invalidate 
the concept of complete testing.  However, the state space of any software at a point in the runtime is calculable.  
Therefore, ISHM extends the viability of the formal V&V methods to the runtime environment, increasing their utility.
Safety Impacts
Source:  2002 Aerospace Safety Analysis Panel (ASAP) Report on ISS
Sustaining Engineering Cost Savings
Source:  2003 Cost Assessment Requirements Document (CARD) for ISS
Hardware Software Integration: CARD Table 3.7.4.D-1 identifies "Resources provided to support PR 
analysis" as a 1st order I&O cost driver.  The same table identifies:  "Resources required to support 
testing and other verification activities" as a 1st order cost driver for both I&O and DDT&E.  
Software Development and Integration Lab: CARD Table 3.7.5.B-1 identifies "…test rig 
troubleshooting and anomaly resolution support…" as a Key Product and Service.
Prime Command & Data Handling Sustaining:
CARD Table 3.4.3.2.D-1 identifies "Number and complexity of anomalies; real time anomaly resolution; 
unknown variable increases as more HW added on-orbit; number of PRACAS requiring C&DH 
expertise; amount of on-going monitoring and trending" as the #1 cost driver for this $22M/year cost 
element.  The third driver includes: "Number and complexity of C&DH system on-orbit."  
Prime Communication & Tracking, Guidance Navigation & Control and other Sustaining:
The CARD contains language for these areas that is similar to C&DH sustaining.
The #1 target of ISHM is rapid anomaly resolution.  While current ISHM tools are 
targeted at acceleration of on-orbit anomaly resolution, the basic 
ISHM structure and technology is extensible to the more 
complex problems often faced in ground testing.  
Training & Operations Cost Savings
Source:  2003 Cost Assessment Requirements Document (CARD) for ISS
SSTF:  CARD Section 4.3.3.2.1C:  "Space Station Training Facility costs are heavily dependant on the number of 
training hours required for both the crew and flight controller training"  and "secondary cost drivers include 
troubleshooting..."
ISHM increases the ability to move training away from the large, costly integrated simulators used for 
troubleshooting of systems anomalies.  Operating the still-required high fidelity simulators is facilitated 
by ISHM because many of the same ISHM components and algorithms used on the flight 
system are identical in the simulator.  
Training Hours:
The current budget for ISS Prime Crew Training is 4552 hours.  Of that, 970 hours (21%) are allocated to ISS systems 
which are related to the ISHM target.  The #1 cost driver (CARD Table 4.3.4.D-1) for Flight Operations, Training and 
Mission Preparation is the "Number of hours of training instruction required."  This includes crew, instructor and flight 
controller training.  
Movement towards skills-based training has been hindered by the need for detailed system 
understanding.  This need is driven by the lack of high level troubleshooting tools such as ISHM.
MCC Console: CARD Table 4.3.4.D-1 identifies "Number of hours of on-console  support,"  "Continuous mission 
support," and the number of  "people who must be in MCC at a given time" as major cost drivers.  It also points to this 
being "diminished by how many Gemini shifts are applied."  Simply achieving the current POP guidelines requires the 
replacement of 40% of the current full shifts by Gemini in FY05.   
ISHM is absolutely required to move our operations concept away from a massive Mission Control Center towards a 
leaner Mission Support Center.
